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Abstract
This study examines the cumulative abnormal returns of mergers and acquisitions in the
healthcare industry over the short and long run. The findings indicate that acquirers, on average,
experience slightly positive abnormal returns in the three day window surrounding
announcement, but this trend is reversed in the long run. In the year following announcement,
acquirers experience negative abnormal returns that are statistically significant. This pattern
occurs in every sub sector within healthcare. The study also finds that transaction and merger
party characteristics possess explanatory merit with regards to acquirer abnormal returns, but the
effects of these characteristics and their statistical significance varies by sector.

INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the healthcare industry has
skyrocketed. In the industry, M&A is a popular strategic response to various challenges, such as
increasing costs or research capacity challenges. Although M&A is one of the most widely
researched areas in finance, the subject remains a puzzle. Results of scholarship on shareholder
returns and post-acquisition performance for acquirers varies significantly. A meta-analysis of
research on the effect of M&A on performance concludes that “unidentified variables may
explain significant variance in post-acquisition performance, suggesting the need for additional
theory development” (King, Dalton, Daily, and Covin 2003).
The purpose of this paper is to identify the determinants of short and long term outcomes
of M&A for the overall healthcare industry as well as each of its sub sectors - biotechnology,
pharmaceuticals, healthcare equipment, healthcare providers & services, and hospitals. The
questions that this study attempts to answer are: (1) what characteristics of M&A in the
healthcare industry lead to short and long run equity value creation and (2) do outcomes and their
determinants differ significantly by sub sector?
Past research has shown that because mergers occur in waves that tend to cluster by
industry, macro trends impact industries differently. While many papers have examined
differences between industries or even focused on M&A in the healthcare industry, there is a gap
in research focusing on variations within a certain industry. In particular, studies have not
examined cross sector differences within the healthcare industry. This study contributes to
current literature on the subject of M&A in the healthcare industry by examining potential
outcome determinants for each of the subsectors in healthcare, as well as by investigating intra
industry differences.

The data used to test the hypotheses is gathered from various databases available on
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The method used in the study is event study
methodology employed over different event windows that include the short and long term time
period surrounding announcement. Like most event studies, the market model is used to
calculate abnormal return. Analysis is conducted on the overall sample of transactions in the
healthcare industry, then on each sector subsample. Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is first
tested for significance from zero. Then, attributes of healthcare M&A are tested to identify
potentially significant determinants of acquirer performance.
The findings indicate that, on average, acquirers earn a slightly positive return in the short
time period surrounding announcement. In the long run, this trend is reversed and acquirers
suffer from significant underperformance. Acquirer returns for each sector follow the same
general trend and do not vary significantly between sectors. However, the significant
determinants of acquirer performance do vary by sector, and even companies with similar
characteristics may experience divergent outcomes depending on the sector.

EXISTING LITERATURE
This section will first discuss scholarship on M&A in all industries, beginning with short
term returns then long term performance. Then it will discuss research on the different factors
that influence outcomes, and finally, studies focused on transactions in the healthcare industry.

M&A Across Industries
The majority of empirical research on the subject focuses on daily returns during the
short time period surrounding announcement. However, results vary depending on the sample

studied. Some determine statistically significant announcement returns, both positive (for
example, Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins 1983; Rosen 2006) and negative (for example, Dodd
1980), while others have concluded that there is no evidence of significant abnormal returns.
Research studying the long-run performance of acquiring firms is similarly varied. The
majority of studies have concluded that acquisitions do not create superior abnormal returns for
the acquirer. In fact, most conclude that acquirers suffer from significantly negative abnormal
returns over the one to three years following the transaction (Asquith 1983; Agrawal, Jaffe, and
Mandelker 1992; Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 2001). Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002)
hypothesizes that the negative long run performance is due to the fact that these studies focus
only on public targets. Their sample includes targets that are private firms and subsidiaries, and
they find that while long run returns are negative for acquirers of public targets, they are positive
for transactions involving private or subsidiary targets. However, these results are not consistent
across scholarship. Multiple studies using a variety of samples have not found evidence of
significant underperformance (Bradley and Jarrell 1988; Franks, Harris, and Titman 1991).

Factors Determining Merger Outcomes
Research also focuses on the relation between merger outcomes and varying attributes
that characterize the acquirer, target, or transaction. These studies attempt to identify factors that
contribute to merger effectiveness. Most scholarship in this field focuses on transaction specific
attributes such as the method of payment or acquirer motives for engaging in the transaction.
However, the results of these studies also diverge heavily, and the exact impact of many of these
factors is ambiguous. For example, the nationality of companies that participate in M&A deals
has been identified as an important factor in determining outcomes. Aw and Chatterjee (2004)

find that cross-border transactions result in increased value, while Moeller and Schilingermann
(2005) find that international transactions have the opposite effect.

Transactions in the Healthcare Industry
Perhaps one of the reasons why the results of the studies discussed above vary
significantly is due to the industry agnostic nature of their samples. There is evidence that
mergers occur in waves, and within these waves, mergers cluster by industry. However, even
studies that focus on a specific industry, in this case healthcare, have diverging results. While
most studies find a slightly positive abnormal return for acquirers in the short run, some find that
these returns are statistically significant (Nazarova 2020), while others do not (Ohashi 2007).
Hassan, Patro, Tuckman, and Wang (2007) finds an overall positive effect on short and long term
abnormal returns, though the effect is only statistically significant for acquisitions, not mergers.
Sorescu, Chandy and Prabhu (2007) attempts to explain these differences by examining product
capital as a driver of long-term stock returns. They find that product capital, as defined as
product development and support assets and measured by a firm’s R&D and marketing spend,
positively and significantly affects an acquirer’s long-term financial performance. Many papers
that attempt to explain these differences test merger motives as a determinant of outcomes. In
particular, they tend to focus primarily on research capacity, specifically acquirers that engage in
transactions as a strategic option to improve innovative output (Aghion and Tirole 1994). Some
have found a positive relation between innovation-driven transactions and subsequent financial
performance in the short and long term (Sevilir and Tian 2012; Bena and Li 2013). In contrast,
(Danzon, Epstein and Nicholson 2007) finds that acquirers do not experience significant positive

abnormal performance, leading them to conclude that mergers are not a solution for firms that
struggle with innovative output.
Overall, there is no consensus on whether M&A creates or destroys values for
shareholders of the acquiring firm, both in the short and long run. Event outcomes vary heavily
across firms. Past literature has also shown that there is no single “best approach” for mergers.
Acquirer returns depend on a myriad of different factors, and outcomes vary significantly
depending on factors relating to the transaction itself and the parties involved, as well as the
broader macro environment.

HYPOTHESIS
The following are the hypotheses tested in this study:
Hypothesis 1: Short and long run average abnormal return for acquirers in healthcare is
significantly different from 0
Hypothesis 2: Acquirer CAR can be determined by at least some variables describing
acquirer characteristics, target attributes, and merger motives at a significant level
Hypothesis 3: Short and long run returns differ significantly between sub sectors within
the healthcare industry
Hypothesis 4: Variables that significantly impact long and short run returns differently
affect acquirers in different sectors and have varying significance

DATA
Relevant Transactions Sample Selection
To form the M&A samples, the relevant transactions are first identified using the “SDC
Mergers & Acquisition” database by Thomson Reuters. The transactions must meet the
following requirements:
● Date Announced: Transaction announcement date between 1995-01-01 to 2017-01-01
● Form of transaction: The transaction must characterize a real change of ownership,
meaning the acquirer must hold less than 50% of the target firm prior to the deal, and
own more than 50% after deal completion. Therefore, only deals coded as a merger or an
acquisition of majority interest are retained.
● Deal Status: Deal is completed and closed
● Acquirer Macro Industry: Macro industry of acquirer is classified as ‘healthcare’ based
on SIC Codes, NAIC Codes, and overall company business description
● Target Macro Industry: Macro industry of acquirer is classified as ‘healthcare’ based on
SIC Codes, NAIC Codes, and overall company business description
● Acquirer Public Status: Acquirer must be public at the announcement and currently
trading on the exchange
● Transaction Volume: The value of the transaction is a least US$1 million
● Coverage of the acquirer on Compustat/CRSP
Due to the non-normality of daily stock returns, the sample has a significant presence of
outliers and high leverage data points (Brown and Warner 1985). Because inferences from OLS
regressions are sensitive to the presence of outliers and high leverage data points, the data is then

trimmed (Huber 1973; Yohai 1987). To remove outliers, the firms with the top 5% and bottom
5% of CARs for the event period [-3,+264] as calculated using the MM model, are removed.

METHODOLOGY
This paper uses standard event study methodology to evaluate the short and long run
share performance of companies that engage in M&A.
The majority of studies focus on the short time period in the days surrounding
announcement. However, studies show that exclusively using a short time window for event
study can lead to serious misinterpretation of merger effects (Oler, Harrison, and Allen 2008),
because the immediate market response to M&A announcements does not accurately reflect their
full economic impact. Oler et al. (2008) finds that the market response at the time of
announcement is often incomplete, but over time, the market will correct itself as additional
information becomes available. As a result, performance outcomes of M&A only become
evident in the long run (Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker 1992; Loughran and Vijh 1997).
Therefore, to assess the full impact of M&A and the factors that drive its outcomes, returns for
both short and long term time periods are included in this study.

Calculation of Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR)
This event study is based on abnormal return, which is calculated as the difference
between the actual ex-post return of a security and the expected return over the event window:
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡 )
where,
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = Abnormal return of stock i at the point of time t

𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = Return of the stock i at the point of time t
𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ) = Expected return of the stock i at the point of time t

The expected return is calculated using the Market Model, which assumes a stable linear relation
between the market return and the security return:
𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 × 𝑅𝑚,𝑡
where,
𝛼𝑖 = Firm-specific component of the return of stock i
𝛽𝑖 = Sensitivity of the return of stock i towards the return of the benchmark
𝑅𝑚,𝑡 = Return of the market index at the point of time t

The CAR for each firm is calculated as the sum of abnormal returns of every day in the event
period:
𝑡2

𝐶𝐴𝑅[𝑡1,𝑡2] = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑡=𝑡1

Abnormal return is calculated using the Daily Event Study tool by Wharton Research
Data Services (WRDS).

Model Parameters
This study analyzes an event period of, in total, 268 trading days through 7 different
event windows. The estimation period consists of the 250 trading days ending 22 days before the
announcement date with at least 100 non-missing daily returns (Table 1).

The event window used to evaluate short-run impact is the three day period surrounding
announcement, denoted as [-1,1]. This event window is recommended by MacKinlay (1997)
since it allows for spillover effects in surrounding days and does not weaken the statistical power
of the test. Other commonly implemented event windows, such as [-3,3] or [0], are used to
further examine returns prior to and during announcement, and to enable a comparison of results
to existing event studies in the healthcare industry. The event windows used to measure short run
excess returns are as follows: [-3,+3], [-2,+2], [-1,+1], [0], [-3,0], [0,+3].
This study also evaluates long run performance by examining abnormal returns over the
one year horizon following announcement. The event window of [-3,+264] is used, as it
corresponds to roughly one calendar year after announcement.

Selection of Independent Variables for Multivariate Analysis
To further study the market reaction to the announcement, as well as the long run impact
of the transaction, the acquirer’s abnormal returns are regressed on several explanatory factors.
Three classes of factors are used to explain M&A success: target-specific attributes, acquirerspecific attributes, and transaction-specific attributes. Table 2 provides an overview of each
independent variable and its calculation.
Acquirer Specific Variables
Sales Performance
A commonly cited rationale for mergers is sales performance. However, there is mixed
evidence of the impact of sales growth on merger success, both in the short and long run. Some
studies have found that sales performance is not a significant motivation for M&A (Higgins and
Rodriguez 2006), while other studies have found that sales performance has a positive and

significant impact on stock market returns (Sorescu et al. 2007). Sales performance of the
acquirer is measured using two variables: Change in Sales and Sales to Assets Ratio. The percent
change of sales between year t-3 and year t-1 indicates the overall growth trend of the company,
while the ratio of sales to total assets for year t-1 gives an overall picture of the company’s sales
power and ability to generate sales with its current assets.
R&D Intensity
In healthcare, innovative research is critical to success and future profitability. R&D
investment is known to be a critical input in a firm’s technical capability and can be used to
capture a firm’s level of technological investment (Sorescu, et al. 2007). Therefore, firms with
lower R&D expense ratios are more likely to be acquirers, as mergers can be an opportunity for
companies with weak research capacity to acquire innovation (Sevilir and Tian 2012). Based on
the assumption that increased R&D spend leads to higher levels of innovation, the ratio of R&D
expense to sales for year t-1 is used to measure research intensity of a firm (Rothaermel 2006;
Kirchhoff and Schiereck 2011). The variable is denoted as R&D to Sales Ratio.
Profitability
Another commonly cited merger rationale is cost synergies, and multiple papers have
found that cost synergies are one of the most important drivers for M&A activity in the
healthcare industry (Kerler 2000). Merger activity can often be a response to declining
profitability, as realization of economies of scale would increase margins. Acquirer profitability
is measured with the Change in Profit variable, which is defined as the lagged percent change in
operating margin between year t-3 and year t-1. The operating margin is the ratio of operating
profit and total sales for the year. Operating profit is calculated as the difference between sales
and total operating expense.

Operating Cost Efficiency
As stated before, cost synergies are an important driver for M&A activity (Kerler 2000).
As a response to increasing operational expenses, such as rising marketing or research costs,
companies may become acquirers as a way to increase profitability through the realization of
economies of scale. Operating cost efficiency is measured with Change in OpEx, which is the
percentage change in a company’s total operating expenses between year t-3 and year t-1.
Firm Size
Firm size is a common and important variable to consider when measuring the impact of
M&A. Overall, literature focusing on the impact of acquirer size on M&A success finds an
inverse relation between firm size and returns. Smaller acquirers tend to generate higher returns
for shareholders than larger acquirers do, because larger acquirers are more likely to overpay
(Gorton et al. 2009). Moeller et al. (2005) supports this hypothesis, finding that small acquirers
create value for their shareholders, while large acquirers destroy value.
Firm size is measured in two ways: Enterprise Value and Change in Assets. Enterprise
value is a measure of a company’s total value and is calculated as the sum of the market value of
the firm’s equity and net debt. The percentage change in total assets from year t-3 to year t-1 is
an indication of total firm growth. Sorescu et al. (2007) and Kirchoff and Schiereck (2011) both
use total assets to evaluate stock market reactions to size-related merger strategies.
Target Specific Variables
Target Public Status
This study also examines whether the target firm’s public status affects the acquirer’s
financial outcome. Past research has found a significant relation between the acquirer’s short run
announcement return and the public status of the target. Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002)

found that acquirers lose when purchasing a public firm but experience positive returns when
purchasing a private firm or a subsidiary. Three indicator variables are created to measure the
target’s public status. Public Target equals one if the target firm in a given M&A deal is publicly
traded on the announcement date, Private Target equals one if the target firm is private on the
announcement date, while Subsidiary Target equals one if the target firm is a subsidiary of
another firm on the announcement date.
Transaction Specific Variables
This paper also evaluates whether different merger motives affect merger outcomes. To
measure merger motive as a potential determinant of returns, an indicator variable is created to
represent each of the six merger rationales examined. A merger motive indicator variable equals
1 when all conditions described are met. The motive variables are not mutually exclusive, and an
acquirer can have multiple motives for a given transaction.
Strategic Focus Motive
Research on the impact of strategic focus motives has diverged. Some papers find that
diversification increases value through risk reduction and economies of scope (Comment and
Jarrell 1995). However, other papers, particularly those focused on the healthcare industry, find
that higher strategic focus leads to higher returns through risk reduction and knowledge overlap
(Sorescu et al. 2007). These studies find that technological overlap has a positive effect on both
the likelihood to merge and post-merge returns through synergies from combining research
capabilities (Hoberg and Phillips 2010; Bena and Li 2014). The strategic focus indicator variable
is determined by the industry relatedness and overlap between the acquirer and the target.
Strategic Focus Motive equals 1 if the Thomson Reuters mid industry classification of the target
and the acquirer are the same.

High Expected Excess Capacity Motive
Danzon et al. (2007) finds that one of the main motivations for merger activity in the
industry is the expectation of a future gap in the product pipeline. These gaps cause a decline in
future revenue growth rate and create excess capacity in the firm’s departments. The study
measures a firm’s expected excess capacity using Tobin’s q, the lagged percentage change in
sales, and the lagged percentage change in total operating expenses.
Tobin’s q reflects a firm’s expected growth opportunities. Therefore, a firm with a
promising pipeline of products will have a large Tobin’s q, while a firm with few promising
products would have a lower Tobin’s q. Percentage change in sales is included, as it indicates
expected productivity of quasi-fixed factors. A relatively slow sales growth rate would imply that
the productivity of these factors is or will soon be declining. Finally, percentage change in
operating expenses from year t-3 to year t-1 is included, as cost reduction is a common initial
response to a projected sales slowdown. Thus, acquirers motivated by high expected excess
capacity are characterized by a relatively low Tobin’s q, lagged percentage changes in sales, and
lagged percentage change in total operating expenses.
To test the effect of this motive on acquirer returns, an indicator variable, Excess
Capacity Motive, is constructed. Excess Capacity Motive equals 1 if the acquirer meets all three
of the characteristics described above. The determination of whether a characteristic is ‘low’ or
‘high’ is based on the variable’s value relative to the mean of the sample tested by Danzon et al.
(2007). A low Tobin’s q is defined as a Tobin’s q less than 3.03. Low sales growth is defined as
a lagged sales growth from t-3 to t-1 of less 25%. Low lagged total operating expenses change is
defined as a lagged total operating expense percent change from t-3 to t-1 of less than 25%.

Economies of Scale Motive
A common rationale for M&A is the realization of economies of scale in R&D and sales
and marketing. If achieving economies of scale is the primary motive for a merger, then smaller
firms would be expected to act more frequently as acquirers than large firms do. To test the
effect of this motive on acquirer returns, an indicator variable, Economies of Scale Motive is
created, where indicator equals 1 if the firm size is classified as small (enterprise value less than
US$1 billion). Danzon et al. (2007) uses firm size as a determinant of the economies of scale
motive but notes that this motive and the excess capacity motive should be complementary.
Geographic Expansion Motive
Geography is an important consideration regarding healthcare M&A. Cross-border
transactions are often used as a strategic option to facilitate the entry into new markets or to
expand a firm’s position in foreign countries. Research on the impact of the geographical
expansion motive on returns is mixed. Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) finds that cross-border
transactions are positively correlated with returns, as they help diversify country-specific
macroeconomic risks, while Amihud and Lev (1981) find that operational overlap and cultural
differences limit synergy realization. Kirchoff and Schiereck (2011) and Danzon et al. (2007) do
not find a significant correlation between the geographic expansion motive and the acquirer’s
abnormal returns. To test the effect of the geographic expansion motive on abnormal returns, the
indicator variable of Geographic Expansion Motive is created. The indicator equals 1 if the
nation of the acquirer and the target are different, signifying an international transaction.
Financing and Agency Issues Motive
According to the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), some mergers are primarily
motivated by the management’s self-interest. The agency motive argues that transactions occur

due to management’s empire building aspirations and high access to cash. Therefore,
management will identify target firms based on ability to increase personal welfare. Accordingly,
acquirer gain should be relatively small or negative. Acquisitions undertaken due to the agency
motive are expected to be positively related to a high ratio of cash to sales (Danzon et al. 2007),
which would indicate availability of financing or imperfect agency concerns. The indicator
variable, Agency Issue Motive, equals 1 when a firm is classified as having a high cash to sales
ratio, defined as a ratio exceeding 2.9 (the mean of the sample tested in Danzon et al. (2007)).

Sector Subsamples
The sample is then divided into subsamples based on the acquirer’s mid industry
classification on the Thomson Reuters M&A database. The healthcare industry is comprised of
five sectors: biotechnology (biotech), healthcare equipment (HCE), healthcare providers &
services (HMO), hospital, and pharmaceuticals (pharma). The purpose of creating sector-based
subsamples is three-fold:


First, it gives the ability to compare event outcomes by sector. Dividing the dataset into
subsamples allows testing for variation in the short and long run performance of acquirers
between sectors. It answer the questions: do the short and long run performance of
acquirers within each sector match the trend for the overall healthcare industry? Are there
significant differences in outcomes between the sectors?



Second, it allows for the determination of whether the explanatory power of each
category of determinants (acquirer, target, transaction) varies by sector. Are different
variables more significant in determining outcomes than others? If so, which factors are
most important in each sector?



Finally, it answers whether transactions with similar attributes experience different
outcomes depending on their sector. Do these variables have different impacts on returns
for acquirers in different sectors?

RESULTS
Overall Sample Analysis
Cumulative Abnormal Return: Significance and Variability
The data sample includes 871 transactions in the healthcare industry between the years
1995 and 2017 that fulfill the requirements described above (Table 2).
Table 3 reports average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), descriptive statistics, and
significance for each event period tested. The p-values are estimated using two tailed one sample
t-tests. The study finds that in the short run, acquirers experience slightly positive announcement
returns, but suffer from significant underperformance in the long run. In every short-term event
window, the CARs are positive, and for most event windows, the result is significantly
significant. The slightly positive and statistically significant abnormal returns in the event
window prior to announcement (0.61% in [-3,0]) can also serve as evidence of price run-up in
the pre-event period. Asquith et al. (1983) also found significant gains in the days leading to
announcement. This finding is consistent with the value-maximizing hypothesis of management
behavior of acquiring firms.
Table 3 also shows the long run abnormal return for the sample. The average CAR of
firms in the sample over the event window [-3,+264] is negative 10.30% and highly significant.
Therefore, on average, shareholders of the acquirer firms lose value from M&A in the long run.
This result is consistent with other studies on the stock market reaction to merger

announcements. Rosen (2006) also found evidence of a long run reversal, where the initial
positive short-run reaction to an announcement becomes fully reversed in the long term, when
the track record of the merger becomes known.
The results also show that success of transactions vary substantially across firms. The
high standard deviations indicate that the CARs are heavily spread out, and the performance of
the top quartile of acquirers is very different from that of the bottom quartile. This difference
becomes more pronounced as the time horizon increases. This is consistent with previous
research focused on transactions in the healthcare industry (Sorescu, et al. 2007).
Figure 1 shows the mean CAR calculated for the long term event window of [-3,+264].
The figure illustrates the initial positive market reaction to acquisition announcement, and the
subsequent long run negative CAR. The results of the placebo text conducted on the long run
even window of [-3,+264] further confirm the statistical significance of the returns (Figure 2).
Overall, the data shows that while on average, short term acquirer return is slightly
positive and statistically significant, shareholders of the acquiring firm will lose value in the long
run. However, success of transactions vary substantially across firms.
Multivariate Analysis of Potential Outcome Determinants
Acquirer Specific Variables
Acquirers in the healthcare industry are extremely heterogeneous, as shown in the high
variance in key measures such as Change in Sales, Change in OpEx, and Change in Assets. The
set of acquirer specific independent variables explains just 2% of the market’s short run
announcement reaction and the acquirer’s long term share performance (Table 4). None of the 7
acquirer specific variables can explain both short run and long run share performance at a
statistically significant level. The results show that sales performance, as measured by Change in

Sales and Sales to Assets Ratio, has a slightly negatively but statistically insignificant effect on
merger success. This finding is consistent with most studies on M&A in the industry, which find
that sales performance is neither a significant motivation for merger activity nor a significant
determinant of success. Additionally, R&D intensity, as measured by the R&D to Sales Ratio is
also negatively correlated with merger performance. This is consistent with past research finding
that firms with lower R&D intensity are more likely to become acquirers as a way to improve
research capabilities.
Target Specific Variables
Most transactions involve a private target, while just 10% involve a target that is a
subsidiary of another firm (Table 5a). Table 5b describes the multiple regression results of short
term (event window [-1,+1]) and long term (event window [-3,+264]) abnormal returns using
only target specific variables. The results show that, apart from public targets, the public status of
the target is not a significant determinant of merger success, both in the short and long run.
Transaction Specific Variables
Table 6a gives the number of acquisitions based on the merger motive of the acquirer.
Most transactions are undertaken with a strategic focus motive. Another common reason for
acquirers to engage in M&A is to achieve economies of scale.
Table 6b describes the multiple regression results of short term ([-1,+1]) and long term
([-3,+264]) abnormal returns using only transaction specific variables. The results indicate that
an acquirer’s merger motive is not a significant determinant of short run market reaction, as
indicated by the fact that none of the five transaction specific variables are statistically
significant at the 5% level for short run CAR. However, in the long run, merger motives become
a more important determinant of an acquirer’s financial performance.

The regression results show that firms that engage in M&A for strategic reasons
experience a positive impact on long run CAR. This is consistent with past research that finds
that technological and sector overlaps between the target and acquirer have a positive impact on
long run success (Bena and Li 2013). However, the strategic focus factor is only significant at
the 10% level. Additionally, firms that engage in M&A with an excess capacity motive or
geographic expansion motive are successful, and experience positive and statistically significant
CARs over the long term. The positive and significant excess capacity motive variable indicates
that mergers are a good way for companies to improve research and innovation capabilities. This
finding is consistent with that of past research (Sevilir and Tian 2012; Bena and Li 2013). The
results also show that transactions are indeed an effective way for a company to either enter new
markets in different countries or to expand market share. Moreover, mergers that are motivated
by management’s self-interest, as indicated by the variable Agency Issues Motive experience
negative CAR, as expected.
Overall, multiple regression results illustrate that an acquirer’s motive for engaging in
M&A is the biggest determinant of long run transaction success. Successful acquirers are
characterized by a low lagged sales growth rate, strategic focus motive, excess capacity motive,
or a geographic expansion motive.

Analysis by Subsample
As explained above, further analysis is conducted on five subsamples based on the acquirer’s
industry: biotechnology (biotech), healthcare equipment (HCE), healthcare providers & services
(HMO), hospital, and pharmaceuticals (pharma).
Subsample Cumulative Abnormal Return: Significance and Variability

Table 7a gives the number of transactions in each subsample. Most transactions occur
with acquirers in the HCE sector, while just 5% of transactions involve a hospital acquirer.
Table 7b and Table 7c report the average CARs and descriptive statistics for each sector
in the short and long run, respectively. A two-tailed one sample t-test is also conducted to
determine whether each of the sectors’ abnormal returns are statistically significant. The results
of each t-test, as well as the respective p-values are also reported in Tables 7b and 7c.
On average, there is an even distribution of outcomes across subsamples. Average CAR
in each subsample follows the trend observed in the broader dataset. For the short term event
window of [-1,+1], every subsample has slightly positive CARs, but only the HMO sector has
statistically significant abnormal returns. In the long term ([-3,+234]), the average CAR for all
subsamples is negative and significant at the 1% level. While acquirers in the HMO and HCE
sector have the highest short run average CARs, they have the lowest long run average CARs.
Differences between the subsamples are not significant in the short or long term (Table
8a and Table 8b). The subsample results are consistent with previous studies that have focused
on different sub sectors within the healthcare industry. Hassan et al. (2007) and Ohashi (2007)
find slightly positive but statistically insignificant short run abnormal returns for acquirers in
pharmaceuticals and the medical device industry, respectively. Similar to the general dataset,
outcomes vary across firms, even within each sector subsample. The variance between average
CARs of acquirers within subsets again becomes much more pronounced in the long run.
Multivariate Analysis of Potential Outcome Determinants by Subsample
Biotechnology Sector
Acquirers in the biotech subsample tend to have a high growth in sales, total operating
expense, and profitability, as well as a high level of R&D intensity. Motives for engaging in

M&A are quite evenly distributed, but the economies of scale motive is the most popular,
followed by the geographic expansion motive (Table 9a).
The key determinants of biotech acquirer’s performance differ from those of the general
healthcare industry (Table 9b). Most factors that significantly explain returns for the overall
sample are not statistically significant in the multiple regression for the biotech subsample. The
15 independent variables in the three categories explain 53% of short run abnormal returns and
33% of long run abnormal returns at a statistically significant level. In the short run, both public
and private targets have a significant negative effect on acquirer return. Though, in the long run,
returns are negative for acquirers of public targets, but positive for transactions involving
subsidiary targets. This result is consistent with that of Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002). It
is interesting to note that in contrast to the general sample, the multiple regression suggests that
transaction specific factors have a more significant effect on returns in the short run than in the
long run. Three motive variables (Strategic Focus, Economies of Scale, and Agency Issue) have a
statistically significant effect on short run CARs, while only the Agency Issue Motive has a
significant effect on long run performance. Additionally, in this subsample, strategic focus has a
negative impact on short run returns, while the agency issues motive has a positive effect. In the
long run, the sign of the effects are flipped, which is consistent with results for the overall
sample and past literature.
On a category specific level, the set of target-specific variables has the most explanatory
power in the short run. Target-specific variables explains 12.7% of the acquirer’s short run
excess returns, at a statistically significant level of 1%. Acquirer specific variables significantly
explain both short and long run CARs (Table 14a, 14b, and 14c).

Pharmaceutical Sector
Acquirers in the pharma subsample also tend to have a high growth in sales and
profitability, as well as relatively high R&D intensity. The primary motive for transactions is
strategic focus (46%), followed by geographic expansion (36%), and high expected excess
capacity (27%). Again, the standard deviation for each of these variables is quite high, showing
that pharma acquirers are also very diverse (Table 10a).
The key determinants of the pharma subsample’s performance also differ from those of
the general healthcare industry. The set of determinants significantly explains short run returns
(5% significance level), but not long run returns. In the short run, acquirers are characterized by
a low level of R&D intensity and decreasing total operational expense. The multiple regression
serves as evidence for Aghion and Tirole’s (1994) hypothesis pharma acquirers often use M&A
as a response to signs of future trouble. As Danzon et al. (2007) concludes, the results of the
regression indicate that this strategy is not an effective long term solution to struggles with
research capacity, although it does result in a short term positive market reaction (Table 10b).
On a categorical level, the set of acquirer-specific variables explains short run returns at a
highly statistically significant level (<1%), but no set is significant for long run performance.
This is different from the overall healthcare sample, where the set of acquirer specific variables
is not significant for short or long run returns (Table 14a, 14b, and 14c).
Healthcare Providers & Services (HMO) Sector
Acquirers in the HMO subsample also tend to have a high growth in sales and
profitability, but a much lower average level of R&D intensity compared to biotech and pharma.
Over half of transactions in the sector have a private target (56%), and primary motives are
strategic focus (61%) and economies of scale (42%). In contrast to biotech, geographic

expansion and agency issue driven transactions in the HMO sector are very rare, accounting for
just 5% and 1% of transactions, respectively (Table 11a).
The 15 independent variables in the three categories do not explain HMO acquirer returns
at a significant level. This is most likely due to the lack of information available on the selected
variables for this subsample (Table 11b).
Healthcare Equipment (HCE) Sector
Acquirers in the HCE subsample also tend to have a high growth in operational expenses
and profit, as well as a much lower average level of R&D intensity (15%) relative to biotech and
pharma. Most transactions in this sector are due to the strategic focus motive (67%) (Table 12a).
The key determinants of HCE short and long run performance are not similar to those of
the overall healthcare industry. The set of independent variables significantly explains 10% of
short run abnormal returns and 11% of long run performance. In the 3 days surrounding
announcement, change in profit and the excess capacity motive have a significant negative effect
on CAR. In the long run, none of the motive mergers affect returns in a significant way. The
results of the regression suggest that the majority of HCE acquisitions occur due to motives
different from those tested in this study (Table 12b).
On a category specific level, the set of target specific variables explains short run returns
at a significance level of 5%. For the long run, all three sets of determinants significantly explain
excess returns, with acquirer specific variables having the most explanatory power (Table 14a,
14b, and 14c).
Hospital Sector
Acquirers in the hospital subsample have a high sales to assets ratio, change in profit, and
change in total assets. The variable R&D intensity is not applicable in this subsample. Most

transactions involve a private target, and almost half have a strategic focus motive. In contrast,
transactions with a geographic expansion or agency issue motives are very rare (Table 13a).
The set of independent variables explains 36% of short run abnormal return and 30% of
long run abnormal return, but not at a significant level. Like the overall sample, some transaction
specific variables do have a significant effect on long run returns, although they are not
significant in the short term. Both the economies of scale and the geographic expansion motives
have a significant negative effect on long run returns. The multiple regression suggests that
markets do not believe in top line synergies for hospital acquirers, and that markets favor
domestic transactions and believe that synergies are harder to realize for international
transactions (Amihud and Lev 2002; Moeller and Schilingermann 2005) (Table 13b).
On a category specific level, the set of variables that are acquirer specific has the largest
effect on short and long abnormal returns (Table 14a, 14b, and 14c).
Overall, returns for each subsample follow the same trend of slightly positive announcement
returns, then a long-term reversal, with acquirers in each sub sector losing shareholder value
within the year following the transaction. Although certain sectors perform relatively better in
the short or long run, the differences in the average CARs of the sectors is not statistically
significant. The explanatory power of each set of determinants does vary between sectors, and
the significant sets for each sector do not always match that of the general sample. The set of
transaction specific variables that examined merger motives did not become significant for all
sectors in the long term. This suggests that even within the healthcare industry, merger motives
vary significantly between sectors and across firms. The multiple regression analysis also shows
that even transactions/acquirers sharing similar attributes can experience very different outcomes
depending on the sector. The different independent variables sometimes have different impacts

depending on the sector of the acquirer. For example, while the geographic motive has a positive
impact on returns for biotech acquirers, it has the opposite effect for hospitals. The results of the
subsample analysis further prove that M&A is an extremely complicated subject area, and
outcomes vary significantly even within an industry.

CONCLUSION
Results from this study find that while M&A does result in positive abnormal returns in
the short run, these transactions significantly destroy shareholder value in the long term. Thus,
the mystery remains: if on average, M&A destroys shareholder value, why do firms continue to
do it so frequently? No set of variables tested in the study significantly impact short run and long
run returns across sectors. In the overall healthcare industry, merger motives do not significantly
impact short run returns, but they do in the long run. In the year following the announcement,
merger motives become a significant indicator of long run acquirer abnormal returns. This result
supports the hypothesis that the effects of M&A take time to be reflected in the market.
The study also proves that the factors that significantly influence outcomes vary by sector
within the healthcare industry. Different sets of variables are significant depending on the sub
sector of the acquirer. Though the factors influencing outcomes are significant, differences in
sector returns themselves are not.
The results of this study serve as further evidence of the fact that merger outcomes differ
significantly by firm, even within a specific industry or sub sector. This suggests the need for
continued theoretical development on the subject.
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APPENDICES
Table 1: Summary of Model Parameters
Estimation Period

Event Window (in days)

Estimation Window

250 days

Minimum Number of Valid Returns

100 observations

Gap

22 days

Short Run

[-3,+3]
[-2,+2]
[-1,+1]
[0]
[-3,0]
[0,+3]

Long Run

[-3,+264]

Table 2: Overview of Independent Variables
Category
Determinant
Variables
Acquirer
Sales
Lagged percent change in
Specific
Performance
sales
Ratio of sales to total
assets
R&D Intensity Ratio of R&D expenses to
sales
Profitability
Lagged percent change in
operating profitability
Operating Cost Lagged percent change in
Efficiency
total operating expenses
Firm Size
Growth in total assets
Enterprise value
Target
Specific

Public Status
of Target

Public target
Private target
Subsidiary target

Transaction
Specific

Merger
Motives

Strategic focus

High expected excess
capacity

Economies of scale
Geographic expansion

Calculation
% change in sales from year t-3 to
t-1
Sales t-1 / total assets t-1
R&D expenses t-1 / sales t-1
% change in operating profit from
t-3 to t-1
% change in total operating
expense from t-3 to t-1
% change in total assets from t-3
to t-1
Market equity value + Debt Cash
Indicator = 1 if target is publicly
traded on announcement
Indicator = 1 if target private on
announcement
Indicator = 1 if target is a
subsidiary on announcement
Indicator = 1 if mid industry
classification of target and
acquirer are the same on
Thomson Reuters
Indicator = 1 if acquirer has low
Tobin’s q, low lagged percent
change in sales, and low lagged
percent change in total operating
expenses
 Low Tobin’s q = Tobin’s q <
3.03
 Low sales growth = lagged
sales change from t-3 to t-1 <
25%
 Low lagged total operating
expense change = lagged opex
change from t-3 to t-1 < 25%
Indicator = 1 if acquirer’s
enterprise value < US $1 billion
Indicator = 1 if nation of acquirer
and target are not the same

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics & T-test Results – CARs for all Event Windows
Event
Window

Descriptive Statistics

T-test

Average (%)

Std. Dev.
(%)

Bottom
Quartile
(%)

Top
Quartile
(%)

t

p value

[-3,+3]

0.75%**

9%

3.20%

4.40%

2.39

0.01691

[-2,+2]

0.54%

8%

-2.90%

3.50%

1.9

0.05741

[-1,+1]

0.68%***

7%

-2.20%

3.30%

2.7

0.006973

[0]

0.19%

5%

-1.40%

1.60%

0.0019

0.2793

[-3,0]

0.61%***

7%

-2.40%

2.90%

2.72

0.006657

[0,+3]

0.59%***

8%

-2.70%

3.60%

2.61

0.009191

[-3,+264]

-10.30%***

36%

-34.00%

14.50%

-8.37

<0.001

Note: ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level

Figure 1: Mean Cumulative Abnormal Return for the Event Window [-3,+264]

Figure 2: Placebo Test Results – Mean Cumulative Abnormal Return for the Event
Window [-3,+264]

Table 4b: Regression Analysis Summary for Acquirer Specific Variables Predicting CAR

Table 5a: Transaction Count by Target Specific Variables
Target Public Status

Number

Percent of Total

Public

365

41.91%

Private

411

47.19%

Subsidiary

95

10.91%

Table 5b: Regression Analysis Summary for Target Specific Variables Predicting CAR

Table 6a: Transaction Count by Transaction Specific Variables
Merger Motive

Number

Percent of Total

Strategic Focus

489

38.35%

Excess Capacity

222

17.41%

Economies of Scale

308

24.16%

Geographic Expansion

218

17.10%

Agency Issue

38

2.98%

Table 6b: Regression Analysis Summary for Transaction Specific Variables Predicting
CAR

Table 7a: Number of Transactions in each Subsample
Sector

Number

Percent of Total

Biotech

78

8.97%

HCE

328

37.70%

HMO

186

21.38%

Hospital

45

5.17%

Pharma

233

26.78%

Table 7b: Summary of Short Run CARs for each Subsample
Subsample

Descriptive Statistics

T-test

Average (%)

Std. Dev.
(%)

Bottom
Quartile
(%)

Top
Quartile
(%)

t

p-value

Hospital

1.27%

8.35%

-2.00%

4.00%

1.02

0.3142

HMO

1.26%**

7.10%

-2.00%

3.00%

2.42

0.0164

HCE

0.44%

7.16%

-2.00%

4.00%

1.11

0.266

Pharma

0.34%

7.44%

-3.00%

4.00%

0.69

0.4892

Biotech

0.95%

8.39%

-2.00%

4.00%

1.00

0.3191

Note: ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level
Table 7b: Summary of Long Run CARs for each Subsample
Subsample

Descriptive Statistics
Average (%)

Std. Dev. (%)

Hospital

-21.99%***

32.09%

-42.00%

HMO

-15.05%***

40.16%

HCE

-6.69%***

Pharma
Biotech

test

Bottom
Top Quartile
Quartile (%)
(%)

t

p-value

1.00%

-4.60

<0.001

-46.00%

15.00%

-5.11

<0.001

35.31%

-32.00%

18.00%

-3.43

<0.001

-8.85%***

33.42%

-29.00%

11.00%

-4.04

<0.001

-11.96%***

39.81%

-38.00%

22.00%

-2.65

<0.001

Note: ** Significant at 5% level, *** Significant at 1% level

Table 8a: ANOVA Results of Between-Subsample Effects for Short Run Returns [-1,+1]
Sector (I)

Sector (II)

Sum of
Squares

df

F-value

P-value

Hospital

HMO

0.001

1.00

1.04

0.69

HCE

0.016

1.00

0.16

0.14

Pharma

0.011

1.00

1.64

0.21

Biotech

0.009

1.00

1.34

0.25

Hospital

0.000

1.00

0.16

0.69

HCE

0.004

1.00

2.62

0.11

Pharma

0.003

1.00

1.83

0.18

Biotech

0.007

1.00

4.33

0.04**

Hospital

0.009

1.00

2.32

0.14

HMO

0.010

1.00

2.62

0.11

Pharma

0.000

1.00

0.00

0.97

Biotech

0.039

1.00

10.31

0.00***

Hospital

0.009

1.00

1.64

0.21

HMO

0.010

1.00

1.83

0.18

HCE

0.000

1.00

0.00

0.97

Biotech

0.004

1.00

0.82

0.37

Hospital

0.004

1.00

1.34

0.25

HMO

0.012

1.00

4.33

0.04**

HCE

0.029

1.00

10.31

0.00***

Pharma

0.002

1.00

0.82

0.37

HMO

HCE

Pharma

Biotech

Table 8b: ANOVA Results of Between-Subsample Effects for Short Run Returns [-3,+234]
Sector (I)

Sector (II)

Sum of
Squares

df

F-value

P-value

Hospital

HMO

0.13

1.00

1.18

0.28

HCE

0.07

1.00

0.62

0.44

Pharma

0.01

1.00

0.07

0.79

Biotech

0.00

1.00

0.02

0.88

Hospital

0.15

1.00

1.18

0.28

HCE

0.08

1.00

0.64

0.43

Pharma

0.05

1.00

0.43

0.52

Biotech

0.02

1.00

0.13

0.72

Hospital

0.07

1.00

0.62

0.44

HMO

0.08

1.00

0.64

0.43

Pharma

0.07

1.00

0.56

0.46

Biotech

0.03

1.00

0.29

0.59

Hospital

0.01

1.00

0.07

0.79

HMO

0.04

1.00

0.43

0.52

HCE

0.05

1.00

0.56

0.46

Biotech

0.54

1.00

6.52

0.01**

Hospital

0.00

1.00

0.02

0.88

HMO

0.02

1.00

0.13

0.72

HCE

0.05

1.00

0.29

0.59

Pharma

1.12

1.00

6.52

0.01**

HMO

HCE

Pharma

Biotech

Table 9a: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables – Biotech Sector

Table 9b: Regression Analysis Summary for Predicting CAR in the Biotech Sector

Table 10a: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables – Pharma Sector

Table 10b: Regression Analysis Summary for Predicting CAR in the Pharma Sector

Table 11a: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables – HMO Sector

Table 11b: Regression Analysis Summary for Predicting CAR in the HMO Sector

Table 12a: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables – HCE Sector

Table 12b: Regression Analysis Summary for Predicting CAR in the HCE Sector

Table 13a: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables – Hospital Sector

Table 13b: Regression Analysis Summary for Predicting CAR in the Hospital Sector

Table 14a: Regression Analysis Summary for Acquirer Specific Variables Predicting CAR
for every Subsample

Table 14b: Regression Analysis Summary for Target Specific Variables Predicting CAR
for every Subsample

Table 14c: Regression Analysis Summary for Transaction Specific Variables Predicting
CAR for every Subsample

